Towards a pragmatic approach for dealing with uncertainties in water management practice by Isendahl, N. et al.
Towards a pragmatic approach for dealing with uncertainties in water 
management practice 
Nicola ISENDAHL 1, Claudia PAHL-WOSTL 1, Art DEWULF  2 
1 Institute of Environmental Systems Research (USF), University of Osnabrück, Germany 
2 Public Administration and Policy Group (PAP), University of Wageningen, Netherlands 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The work presented in this paper was financially supported by the European Commission 
(Contract N° 511179 - NeWater). We thank the participants of the Uncertainty Workshops in the 
case studies of the Kromme Rijn and the Wupper for their kind collaboration and openness. We 
further thank Sabine Möllenkamp and Greet François for the help in organizing and running the 
workshops in the Wupper and the Kromme Rijn and Renier Koenraadt for a constructive review 
of an earlier version of the paper. We finally thank Catrin Egerton for proof-reading earlier 
versions of the paper.  
Abstract 
Management of water resources is afflicted with uncertainties. Nowadays it is facing more and 
new uncertainties since pace and dimension of changes (e.g. climatic, demographic) are 
accelerating and are likely to increase even more in the future. Hence it is crucial to find 
pragmatic ways to deal with these uncertainties in water management. So far, decision-making 
under uncertainty in water management is based on either intuition, heuristics and experience of 
water managers or on expert assessments all of which are only of limited use for water managers 
in practice. We argue for an analytical yet pragmatic approach to enable practitioners to deal 
with uncertainties in a more explicit and systematic way and allow for better informed decisions. 
Our approach is based on the concept of framing, referring to the different ways in which people 
make sense of the world and of the uncertainties. We applied and tested recently developed 
parameters that aim to shed light on the framing of uncertainty in two sub-basins of the Rhine. 
We present and discuss the results of a series of stakeholder interactions in the two basins aimed 
at developing strategies for improving dealing with uncertainties. The strategies are synthesized 
in a cross-checking list based on the uncertainty framing parameters as a hands-on tool for 
systematically identifying improvement options when dealing with uncertainty in water 
management practice. We conclude with suggestions for testing the developed check-list as a 
tool for decision aid in water management practice.  
Key words: water management, future uncertainties, framing of uncertainties, hands-on decision 
aid, tools for practice, robust strategies, social learning 
1 Introduction 
Water resource systems are complex systems characterized by multi-level interactions and non-
linear changes over space and time (e.g. Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Different sectors and actors with 
different interests, objectives, and mental models are involved. All these conditions render water 
management issues highly uncertain. Uncertainty in this paper is defined as a situation in which 
there is not a unique and complete understanding of the system to be managed (following 
Brugnach et al., 2008). Management of water resources nowadays is facing more and new 
uncertainties since pace and dimension of changes, particularly climatic and demographic 
changes, are incremental and are likely to increase even more in the future. At the same time, 
decisions in water management are mostly taken in an expert driven way (e.g. Lowe et al., 
2007). In the same way that decision-making processes are strongly influenced by expert 
assessments, addressing problems of uncertainty also happens in an expert mode. So far, 
uncertainties in water management have mostly been assessed from scientific points of view (see 
review by Walker et al., 2003 or Klauer and Brown, 2004). Scientific assessment and analysis of 
uncertainty is based on expert knowledge and hence it is often labour-intensive and technical and 
not always easily understandable, accessible or usable for practitioners on the ground (Brugnach 
et al., 2007, Groves & Lempert, 2007, Mc Culloch, 2007, Patt , 2007). In a nutshell, the 
usefulness of scientific analysis often clashes with requirements in practice. 
Practitioners tend to deal with uncertainties in a more intuitive way (see e.g. Einsiedel, 1999, 
Friend and Hickling, 1997, see Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001a for a review of heuristics). This 
may be a simple non-analytical but nevertheless effective way of decision-making (Gigerenzer 
and Selten, 2001b: 7). Simplifications and biases may be helpful in taking decisions, but such 
heuristics are not always helpful in a broader context, especially in domains where decision-
makers are confronted with novel situations as is the case when dealing with uncertainties (see 
Goldstein et al., 2001: 177). Acting on intuition based on years of experience does not help in 
such situations. Moreover, decision-making through heuristics is not transparent and can be hard 
to explain or justify which can create difficulties, particularly when decisions are being taken by 
public administration. Hosseini (2001:267) presents a range of cognitive simplification processes 
with regard to governmental problems which all hinder to take uncertainties into account. 
Information is misinterpreted or discomforted through ‘prior hypothesis bias’, similar to 
confirmation bias, and final estimates of values get biased towards an initial value through 
‘adjustment and anchoring’ (ibidem). Moreover, leaders may engage in inappropriate 
discounting of negative information with respect to a prior commitment to a course of action in 
order to prolong their years in office (‘escalating commitment’) or they ‘reason by analogy’ 
which means that Analogies are drawn from simple situations to complex strategic problems 
thereby reducing the uncertainty involved in the complex problem (ibidem). The presented 
strategies or biases may be useful to be able to take a decision but are too simplistic to cope with 
uncertainty and complexity. More comprehensive, transparent and structured analytical 
approaches are needed on the ground to effectively deal with uncertainties. 
With regard to structured approaches to support decision making in water management, 
numerous Decision Support Systems (DSS) and other decision aid tools (e.g. Multi-Criteria 
Analysis, Bayesian Belief Networks etc.) do exist already which are useful for their specific 
purposes. Drawbacks, however, are on the one hand that they are often rather rigid and lack 
flexibility in application and require sophisticated software and respective skills. Hence, analysis 
often is performed by scientists or other experts rather than by the practitioners themselves 
(Messner et al., 2006: 70). On the other hand uncertainties are not necessarily addressed 
comprehensively. Either they are not assessed explicitly or are assessed only in a limited way; 
they may, for instance, regard uncertainties as restricted to probabilities, or model and data 
uncertainty, or uncertainty with respect to unforeseeable future developments that is addressed 
through a range of scenarios (ibidem). Frequently, uncertainties are made explicit but no 
strategies are conceived on how to deal with them (see Paneque Salgado et al., 2006).  
In order to find ways to address the problem of uncertainties from the perspective of practitioners 
which are easy for them to apply we consider it essential to draw attention to how practitioners 
frame uncertainties, i.e. their understanding of an uncertainty, the differences in their points of 
views and how they think and feel about an uncertainty. In scientific analysis, the framing of the 
experts and scientists is taken for granted and neutral – whereas it is not – without considering 
that practitioners possibly and likely have a different view than scientists (Dewulf et al., 
2005:123). Methods to assess and deal with uncertainty are developed from a scientific 
perspective, supposedly being objective and rational. Such scientific framing, however, may go 
past practitioners’ needs. We argue for involving stakeholders at an earlier stage of problem 
solving and assess how they themselves conceive of the problems and the uncertainties. 
Understanding how water managers frame uncertainties is then a basis to develop a more tailored 
decision aid tool that meets their needs and allows them to take action possibly without 
additional scientific or other expert assessment and analysis. Our underlying assumption is that 
dealing with uncertainties in a more explicit and structured way allows for better informed 
decisions in water management. That way heuristics may be reflected upon and modified, and 
the drawbacks of actions based on intuition, biases and experience be overcome. That does, 
however, not mean that we argue for by-passing scientific evidence and analysis of uncertainties. 
Rather, we aim at making dealing with uncertainties more comprehensive through involving 
practitioners in an earlier stage of decision-making which is when uncertainties are getting 
framed. Beyond facilitating decision-making for practitioners, needs for scientific support can be 
identified more precisely as to where and what kind of scientific analysis is needed in order to 
make an informed decision. 
In this paper, we present a structured but simple approach to enable practitioners to deal with 
uncertainties in a more explicit and systematic way to prepare and allow for better informed 
decisions. The approach is based on the concept of framing that is how people make sense of the 
world. Dewulf et al. state that there is a “small but growing literature on the framing of 
environmental issues that reveals differences in how stakeholders form interpretations of what is 
at stake and what should be done” (Dewulf et al., 2005: 117). Here, the concept of framing is 
used for analysing uncertainties in water management. Recently, in an ex-post analysis Isendahl 
et al. (in press) developed parameters that aim to shed light on the framing of uncertainty. We 
tested those parameters in two case studies of the EU research project NeWater1 through a series 
of stakeholder interactions for the development of strategies to improve dealing with uncertainty. 
In the Dutch Kromme Rijn and the German Wupper, both sub-basins of the Rhine, uncertainties 
of water management practice were captured and analyzed over several months and strategies to 
improve dealing with uncertainty derived along concrete examples of uncertainty.  
The results section of this paper presents the main results from the discussions on uncertainty in 
the Wupper and Kromme Rijn along the framing parameters. The results are generated from the 
specific examples of uncertainty that were analyzed in the discussions. First the strategies the 
                                                 
1 NeWater, New Approaches for Adaptive Water Management under Uncertainty, funded by the 6th Framework Programme of 
the European Commission, contract n° 511179. www.newater.info 
participants came up with during the research phase are presented for each framing parameter to 
illustrate the applicability of the framing parameters in active analysis (as opposed to the ex-post 
analysis they were derived from). These results are then analyzed and supplemented by findings 
from the authors. From these two sections together we derive a cross-checking list for dealing 
with uncertainties (table 4) which contains the abstracted and condensed findings. We discuss 
the use of the framing parameters and the cross-checking list for water management practice and 
conclude with suggestions for testing that check-list as a tool for decision aid in water 
management practice. 
2 Conceptual background 
In water management complexity and ambiguity play an important role. Uncertainties arise in 
the interplay of natural and human processes with multi-level, non-linear and hence often 
unpredictable behaviours. Uncertainty in this paper is defined as a situation in which there is not 
a unique and complete understanding of the system to be managed (following Brugnach et al., 
2008). This emphasizes the importance of complexity and unpredictability of the system which 
increase the probability of ambiguity, i.e. not having one clear single understanding of the 
system. It also highlights the importance of the concept of framing in a context where different 
actors and organizations interact with their respective interests, values, responsibilities etc. 
rendering decision-making no easy task. Classical decision theory primarily deals with 
structuring a decision as a set of well defined options which may have different consequences. 
Uncertainties are taken into account by probabilistic statements on sets of options and 
consequences (Kreps, 1988) structuring approaches and giving probabilities to action options. 
Framing starts earlier, prior to decision-making. “The framing concept draws the attention to the 
concrete interactions where actors bring in their conceptions of problems and possible solutions, 
and how they affect each other’s frames in and through a developing relationship” (Dewulf et 
al., 2005: 117). Thus the concept of framing comprises a dynamic interactive process taking into 
account different conceptions. This is opposed to most applications of decision theory and 
decision-making processes where framing tends to be already fixed or taken as a given, mostly 
taking on the scientist’s, convenor’s or organizer’s framing. With the concept of framing it is 
possible to assess uncertainties before the actual decision-making process starts. It addresses the 
process that leads to decision-making, which has not achieved much attention yet.  
Framing means that people make sense of the world in different ways in that they cannot and do 
not consider all details and information of a certain situation but select the elements of their 
interest and concern (e.g. Dewulf et al., in press, Dewulf et al., 2004, Gray  2003, Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2007). This holds especially true for uncertainties. There are a lot of concepts around framing 
but little evidence in relation with uncertainties. Recently, Isendahl et al. (in press) developed an 
approach in close relation with practitioners in water management (Dewulf et al., 2008) to shed 
light on framing processes regarding uncertainty. They derived a set of parameters (see table 1) 
in an ex-post analysis of narratives of water managers in several European river basins as key 
aspects of how an actor relates to an uncertainty emerging from recurring issues throughout 
cases of water resources management in several European river basins in the NeWater project 
(see Isendahl et al., in press). 
 
Table 1: Parameters of framing (after Isendahl et al., in press) 
Parameter Definition  
Positioning Positioning as the evaluative quality people attach to 
uncertainties  
Urgency Urgency related to the point of time for taking a decision in 
the uncertainty situation or to the time frame within which 
a decision is supposed to have an effect  
Responsibility  Responsibility for having caused and/or dealing with the 
uncertainty, including the perceived scope of influence on 
the uncertainty situations 
Trustworthiness  How trusting actors are towards components of an 
uncertain situation, e.g. towards data, methods or other 
actors, including patterns of communication and 
dependency between actors. 
 
The list of parameters is added by a differentiation between types of uncertainty from Brugnach 
et al. (2008) which had been used as a structuring device in the empirical research the framing 
parameters are based on. According to the distinction of Brugnach et al. uncertainty may be 
framed as unpredictability, incomplete knowledge or multiple knowledge frames (table 2).  
 
Table 2: Uncertainty categorization by Brugnach et al. (2008) 
Type of uncertainty (knowledge relationship) 
Unpredictability  ? unpredictable system behaviour 
Incomplete knowledge   ? lack of information 
? unreliable information 
? lack of theoretical understanding 
? ignorance 
Multiple knowledge 
frames 
 
? different and/or conflicting ways of 
understanding the system 
? different values and beliefs 
? different judgement about seriousness of 
situation, growth potential of problems, 
priority of actions or interventions 
 
The type of uncertainty together with the four framing parameters form a set of five parameters 
which was used as a grid for analysis and strategy development in the case studies presented in 
this paper. The parameters provide a set of potentially relevant aspects for getting a grip on 
framing of uncertainty. They are not mutually exclusive and the sequence does not imply and 
ranking in importance. They give shape as to how an actor perceives an uncertainty. 
3 Methods 
To analyse strategies for dealing with uncertainties several stakeholder interventions were 
undertaken in the context of the project NeWater. The NeWater project (New Approaches for 
Adaptive Water Management under Uncertainty) (2005-2009) and aimed at analysing and 
fomenting processes of transition to more adaptive processes of water management. The 
development of concepts and tools that guide an integrated analysis and support a stepwise 
process of change in water management was the cornerstone of research activities. In this 
context, exploratory research was undertaken on uncertainties in water management in the form 
of a series of workshops and interviews in sub-basins of the Rhine, the German Wupper and the 
Dutch Kromme Rijn. This paper presents part of the results of the interventions. The results are 
evaluated qualitatively.  
The Wupper basin is located in the German state of North Rhine Westphalia, which is 
characterised by industrial uses and a high density of population. Since decades, the 
anthropogenic development of the region has influenced the rivers in their use and appearance. 
Dams provide the region with drinking water. The Wupper is mainly managed by one water 
authority, which also coordinates different water uses in the Wupper basin. At state level there is 
the regional government and districts and municipalities at lower levels. Besides there are 
numerous and diverse water users and organizations in the Wupper basin. The region faces the 
challenge to implement the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). At the time of the present 
research the water authority had started to lead a participatory process in a subcatchment of the 
Wupper as a pilot project for the implementation of the WFD, which then fed into the formal 
decision-making process at the regional government. The main aim was to restore the fish 
population and reach a better ecological status as required by the WFD. (www.newater.info, 
Möllenkamp et al., 2006)  
The Kromme Rijn subcatchment drains the water from the surrounding hilly and sandy area of 
about 50m a.s.l. The land use in the catchment is diverse: woodland, a nature reserve, several 
large estates and some villages. The lower part is largely used for pastures and horticulture. 
Water in the Kromme Rijn is managed mainly by the waterboard. Further actors that play a role 
in water management decisions are the national and provincial governments as well as the 
municipalities. Stakeholders are also represented by farmers’ organizations, nature federations or 
drinking water companies. The water board is responsible for several water areas for each of 
which they have to set up and implement a water area plan. The Kromme Rijn water area plan 
served as a pilot project for setting that plan up in a participatory way. (www.newater.info, van 
Walsum et al., 2006) 
The stakeholder groups comprised representatives of public administration or other official 
entities responsible for the water management at regional and local level (table 3).  
Table 3: Participants in the case studies  
Wupper: 5 participants Kromme Rijn: 3 participants 
• Water authority (2) 
• Regional government (2) 
• Public administration of a 
municipality in the basin (1) 
• Water board (2) 
• Public administration of a 
municipality in the basin (1) 
In each case study, two group meetings were performed over the length of a year and individual 
interviews with the participants of the group meetings in between. In the first group session, the 
participants were asked to report on situations of uncertainty in their work life and to structure 
them according to the Uncertainty Matrix by Brugnach et al. (2008) which was elaborated on the 
basis of the categories of table 2. From the set of examples the participants chose two to four 
examples they were interested in learning more about and working with. 
The thematic focus of the examples of the two case studies differs due to differences in 
organizational structure and the local problems at hand. In the Dutch Kromme Rijn issues around 
the development of a regional water plan2 prevail since the group of participants had been 
working together on that plan for the past months. The most discussed example is an uncertainty 
about the water supply for agriculture in the area. The water supply at that time did not meet the 
growing demands for irrigation for the fruit farmers in the region. The channels have to be 
broadened in order to increase water supply. The respective ground required for that, however, 
mostly belongs to the cattle farmers who do not need more water. Moreover, in the beginning of 
the problem discussion there was confusion and uncertainty about the responsibility for 
increasing the water supply as it had never been a problem before. The water authority was 
assumed to be responsible by habit of its regulation of the water supply but in fact it is not its 
duty to ensure sufficient water for everybody’s needs. These and more problems and 
uncertainties were to be accommodated in the regional water plan.  
Selected uncertainty situations in the Kromme Rijn: 
1. Uncertainty with regard to the responsibility for water supply in the context of the 
regional water plan 
2. Uncertainty due to contradictory advice. Example of renaturation of river banks where 
the ministries for agriculture and the one for nature conservation gave contradictory 
advice on how to proceed and the water authority had to take a decision.  
3. Uncertainty of more general character referring to (negative) coincidences and surprises. 
In the Wupper, the range of situations is broader since the participants formed less of a coherent 
group than in the Kromme Rijn.  
Selected uncertainties in the Wupper: 
1. Uncertainty in the modelling of eco-systems with regard to the assessment of the good 
ecological status required by the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD), i.e. how to 
best assess and describe natural processes through a model.  
2. Uncertainty about the  implementation of a new participation process as required by the 
WFD, i.e. whom to involve to which extent with which kind of procedure.  
3. Uncertainty of more general character about societal behaviour under pressure, e.g. in 
times of catastrophes like severe accidents or floodings. That means it is not about the 
reaction of the competent authority or emergency measures but about the influence 
society or societal organizations may be able to develop in such times and how that then 
influences decision-making of the responsible entity. 
4. Uncertainty about the consideration of possible aggravation of flooding due to climate 
change in the flood risk maps. Currently, a fixed additional climate change mark-up is 
added which is not seen as satisfactory as it holds high uncertainty. 
Details of the selected uncertainty situations were elicited through individual interviews with the 
same participants, each situation along the framing parameters. For the semi-structured interview 
guide see Appendix I. The results of the interviews served as a basis for the final group 
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discussion which focused on identifying intervention moments and developing strategies for 
improving dealing with uncertainties along the parameters. The analysis draws special attention 
to controversial issues and possible differences in framing between the participants. Reliability 
of data as part of trustworthiness is omitted in the present analysis since it was either not a 
problem or did not play a role at all in the uncertainty situations of the Wupper and the Kromme 
Rijn. This may, however, well be the case in other regions with less intense or elaborated 
acquisition and processing of data. The same applies to the perceived scope of influence as part 
of the responsibility parameter. The participants of the researched case studies reported to be 
satisfied with their possibilities to take influence on the uncertainty situations. This may of 
course be different with other people or situations. 
The interactions were performed in the participants’ native language. The evaluation is based on 
audio files, transcripts and notes taken during the meetings which were cross-checked with the 
participants. Direct citations were used to highlight particular framings. Quotations have been 
translated into English for presentation in this paper. Partly the original quotation is added as a 
footnote to highlight a particular phrasing in Dutch or German. The contributions of the 
individual and group meetings in the case studies reflect the participants’ opinions and not 
necessarily the one of the entity they belong to. They are quoted per case study as WUP for 
Wupper and KR for Kromme Rijn respectively. 
4 Participants’ strategies  
The strategies for improving how to deal with uncertainties presented in the following were 
developed along the framing parameters in the two case studies. The ideas reflect the 
participants’ point of view mainly with regard to the selected uncertainty situations. Due to the 
limited scope here not all contributions from the participants are presented in detail. Emphasis is 
given on examples that are salient in terms of robust strategies or which are controversial. The 
latter are then discussed in section 5. Practitioners’ perspectives and differences between the case 
studies are highlighted and underlined by direct quotations. 
4.1 Type of uncertainty - Unpredictability 
Unpredictability may stem from complex system behaviour and is difficult to overcome (see 
Brugnach et al., 2008). Knowledge about cause-effect relationships and system dynamics can 
then only be obtained up to a certain limit. An attempt to manage irreducible uncertainties due to 
unpredictability at least to a certain extent is given by building scenarios, monitoring and 
evaluation in order to assess a range of possible outcomes, and trace changes in system and 
enhance the overall understanding of the system behaviour (WUP/KR). 
Such approaches are not possible for negative coincidences and surprises such as an unforeseen 
natural catastrophe or a sudden shift in opinion of a stakeholder in a participatory process. These 
are a special form of unpredictability which requires different strategies to deal with. 
Coincidences may be positive as well, e.g. unforeseen increase in financial resources or 
unexpected willingness from a stakeholder to collaborate but the threat of encountering a 
negative one balances out the possible gain of a positive one (KR). The principal aim with regard 
to coincidences is hence preventing them, for which thorough planning and preparation is seen as 
helpful (KR). When for instance organizing a process, the idea is to start in a broad approach and 
then funnel3 and filter things out, thereby reducing the chance of encountering uncertainties and 
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negative surprises (KR). Other important means to deal with coincidences is seen in constant 
communication with all involved actors and in remaining flexible in order to be able to cope with 
surprises that cannot be prevented from happening (KR). In the Wupper, precautionary measures 
plus a quick reaction in a given situation is seen as essential with regard to unforeseen events.  
4.2 Type of uncertainty - Incomplete Knowledge 
Incomplete knowledge refers to knowledge gaps that may be closed. One strategy to do so is to 
solidify or condense information. Regarding the aim to fill knowledge gaps the question was 
discussed whether for decision-makers from public administration it was sometimes better to 
know less, in order to not create more uncertainty. In the Kromme Rijn the opinion is that over 
the long run this would only mean a shifting4 of problems. However, where communication of 
uncertainty from water authority or public administration is likely to provoke or increase the 
uncertainty on the side of the receiver of the message, e.g. a water user or the broad public, it is 
deemed better in the Wupper case to not communicate that uncertainty then. This particularly 
refers to situations of high delicacy and uncertainty that are likely to create panic in the public if 
communicated (WUP).   
Another strategy to get a basis for sound decision-making that was discussed extensively in the 
Wupper case is modelling. Despite the inherent limits of system complexity to accurately depict 
reality and modelling techniques being far from perfect, the Wupper participants attach great 
importance to describing environmental system processes through models. They argue that 
currently no alternative to modelling can be conceived in terms of getting a basis for decision-
making since issues are connected in such a complex way today that decisions cannot be taken 
intuitively anymore.  
4.3 Type of uncertainty - Multiple Knowledge Frames 
Uncertainty due to multiple knowledge frames is likely to happen in multi-actor settings as 
people make sense of issues in diverging ways (Dewulf et al., 2004). Differently conceptualised 
options have then to be balanced out5 in order to come to a decision (WUP, KR). This is seen as 
positive in the case studies since it triggers thinking about a situation and leads to more 
conscious decision-making. Communication was considered as the main strategy for dealing 
with differences in views and knowledge (WUP, KR, see section 4.8). 
An example of differing views emerged in the Wupper case regarding the uncertainty around 
how to incorporate climate change threats into flood risk maps which is difficult due to lack of 
concrete data. There are several opinions which include assigning a global additional mark-up in 
water level to the flood areas as has been done in other regions in Germany (without scientific 
assessment and hence the risk of complaints by affected residents), assigning a mark-up to public 
constructions such as dikes or weirs where private persons are not concerned with their rights 
(where, however, indirectly everybody is affected through payments with tax money) and 
waiting for better scientific proof before taking action. The latter has been chosen so far by the 
public administration after balancing out the different options.  
4.4 Urgency 
The urgency to deal with an uncertainty is often coupled with a deadline for taking a decision, 
which puts stress to the decision-maker (WUP, KR). However, the Kromme Rijn participants 
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regard deadlines as a good means to enforce a decision and therewith resolve the uncertainty, 
similar to solving a normative uncertainty according to Newig et al. (2005). Beyond deadlines, it 
is considered as important in both case studies to take a decision at a certain moment and act 
upon that decision. However, how to determine that moment is a delicate issue. To the question 
‘when do you know enough to take a decision?’ the case studies came up with different 
solutions. In the example of flood risks in the Wupper, and the question of how much time to 
give to the researchers for producing more reliable data on regional climate change impacts, the 
participants put forward that the decision should be with the researchers since they could better 
estimate it. The Kromme Rijn participants are more action oriented and would rather take a 
preliminary decision and design a time frame for its revision as applied in their water area plan. 
4.5 Positioning 
Uncertainty is acknowledged as a fact of life in both cases studies. Per se, however, it is regarded 
as something negative in both case studies, e.g. “I surely like certainty; I prefer not to have 
uncertainty. Dealing with uncertainty is rather cumbersome” (KR). Ultimately the aim is to gain 
certainty, secure as many things as possible and try to avoid or reduce uncertainties: “You cannot 
really say that you want to have and keep the excitement of the uncertainty” (WUP).  
Despite uncertainties having a negative stance for most of the participants, there is agreement 
regarding dealing with uncertainty about the importance to be open minded (KR) and think 
positively towards dealing with uncertainties (WUP). A positive aspect of uncertainties is the 
perception as a challenge and option to learn something new, make more conscious decisions 
and get over the uncertainty: “I have the chance to resolve the uncertainty” (WUP). In the 
Kromme Rijn an advantage of uncertainties is seen in having situations that are still open and 
where “you can still change things about” (KR). Likewise, a member of the regional 
administration in the Wupper states that in general, he is prepared to encounter uncertainties, and 
that he likes the space for action it leaves despite a certain responsibility that comes along with 
that, “since you can not always back up your decisions with norms and regulations” (WUP).  
4.6 Responsibility - for having caused uncertainty 
There are no huge discrepancies in the two case studies between the perceived responsibility for 
having caused the uncertainty and the responsibility for dealing with it. The participants of the 
workshops see uncertainty as something given or part of the process. Specific persons are rarely 
seen responsible for having caused an uncertain situation, but rather situational complex 
circumstances (WUP) or an unclear situation of responsibility for a certain task (in this case 
water supply in the KR).  
4.7 Responsibility - for dealing with uncertainty 
In terms of dealing with the uncertainties, usually the officially responsible entity for the 
respective task, normally public administration, is seen as responsible in both Wupper and 
Kromme Rijn. Others may participate and give their opinion but not have the final decision (KR, 
WUP). One suggestion in the Wupper regarding the issue of climate change and possible impacts 
in the Wupper is to allocate the responsibility at a higher, i.e. national, level (WUP) since climate 
change is not a regional problem and research and coordination tasks are perceived to be 
performed better at a higher level.  
The Wupper participants pointed out the dilemma of increased scope for action but at the same 
time increased responsibility which dealing with situations of uncertainty allows or requires. 
This freedom for action can then also result in a deliberate decision to not take action as long as 
scientific proof (here, regional climate change impacts) is not clear or to delegate responsibilities 
to higher levels (WUP).  
4.8 Trustworthiness - Communication 
Trust among actors is important as lack of trust leads to uncertainty and instability in 
relationships (WUP/KR). Constant open, honest, and transparent communication is seen as a 
crucial means to enable and ensure trust among people. Not only communication per se, but 
specifically communication of uncertainty is seen useful by a participant in the Wupper for 
increasing trust: “Admitting an uncertainty can also lead to understanding on the other side”. 
Communicating one’s own uncertainties to others, however, is not a generally accepted strategy. 
Uncertainties of public authorities for instance, in both case studies, are usually first discussed 
internally or with experts closely involved in the issue at hand, and only then is the result 
communicated to the public. “With the broad public it does not make sense to discuss issues that 
are too technical and complex for them” (WUP). A participant of the Kromme Rijn, by contrast 
considers communication with the public as very important “since people often have good ideas“ 
and sees communication not only as giving information but also asking for reactions (KR). In the 
Wupper it is stressed that regarding communication of one’s own uncertainties one should in any 
case not pretend to be certain when one is not. This goes in line with the participants’ findings in 
Wardekker et al. (2008: 631) that one role of uncertainty information is to prevent false 
certainty. How people take up a message, including an uncertainty, furthermore depends on 
one’s attitude, use of language, and leadership (KR). The importance of language in 
communication of uncertainties is also highlighted by Janssen et al. (2004: 9). In a 
communication process, the Kromme Rijn participants stressed, it is important to (re-)consider 
one’s own role and the role of others involved.  
4.9 Trustworthiness - Involvement of actors 
Involvement of relevant actors is crucial in trust building. However, in participative processes 
not all participants may be highly motivated to contribute, for several reasons, one major one 
being that the initiative for the process often does not come from them (WUP, KR). However, it 
is not seen as advisable to simply bypass such stakeholders since they might nevertheless claim 
their stakes at a later phase of the project (WUP). An approach for the solution of such problems 
is envisaged in making the stakes clear to the respective potential contributors (WUP).  
Another problem encountered in public meetings, both case studies report, is unexpected 
negative contributions which may be detrimental for the trustworthiness of the organizers of the 
respective meeting, i.e. mostly water authorities.  
4.10 Trustworthiness - Expectation towards others 
In multi-actor settings one’s action often implies expectations towards others involved, for 
instance to comply with certain rules, to collaborate or to voice disagreement. In coping with an 
uncertainty making expectations clear can enable the disclosure of options for mutual aid. One 
example in the Kromme Rijn showed that else a lock-in situation may be provoked where 
nobody does anything because everybody assumes somebody else to be responsible. In the 
Kromme Rijn that applied to the situation of a demand of increase in water supply for agriculture 
in the region.  
Making an expectation explicit may also express a certain trust in the other one to meet the 
expectation. In the Wupper this applies to expectations regarding data accuracy and model 
projections (e.g. climate change impacts) directed towards researchers. The researchers are 
trusted to be able to get to sufficiently certain data (WUP). As an example of expectations of the 
public towards them the participants of the water board in the Wupper stated that they are 
expected to be responsible and able to secure them from flooding. This goes in line with findings 
from Michael (1973: 115) on members of e.g. an organization demanding or at least expecting 
certainty from their leaders. Likewise project organizers seek certainty as they expect the 
involved stakeholders to expect certainty from them (KR). 
4.11 Trustworthiness - Dependence on others 
In a multi-party process, reaching a goal may depend on the goodwill of the partners involved, as 
the Kromme Rijn example of broadening water supply channels shows. The uncertainty is 
whether the ground-owning farmers will collaborate because otherwise a) the project could be 
blocked entirely or b) the objectives would have to be forced by authority - which probably 
would not contribute to acceptance at stakeholder level, or c) a completely new solution for the 
area would need to be considered (KR). As a pragmatic approach the water board in the Kromme 
Rijn decided to approach the 65 concerned land owners individually in order to enhance 
understanding and enable negotiation for acquiring the ground.  
5 Towards a hands-on decision aid 
In this section we discuss the participants’ strategies and add or modify them where appropriate 
in order to develop adaptive and robust strategies that promise to perform relatively well across a 
wide range of plausible future states (for the concept of robustness see also Groves and Lempert, 
2007) and to be applicable in water management practice while taking into account long-term 
implications. These options are summed up in table 4. The strategies in the table are to be read as 
possibly entry points to detect options for changes, not as an exhaustive list that has to be 
assessed from top to bottom. For one situation of uncertainty it may be advisable to consider 
several options together and not be fixed on only one. This applies to options both within and 
between framing parameters. The situations may differ in focus of attention. In one situation 
responsibility issues may be more salient, in another urgency for instance. However the case may 
be, we consider it useful to take into consideration all framing parameters in order to improve 
dealing with the uncertainty situation.   
Framing differences are abound throughout all framing parameters. The distinction of a certain 
dominating category or type of uncertainty in an uncertainty situation for instance reflects the 
framing of the respective actor and his conviction towards the manageability of the uncertainty. 
We argue that one should be aware of that, accept that somebody else may have a different but 
equally valid view on the same problem and be open to reframe one’s own view. 
Essential for enabling reframing is trust among the actors involved. An important role for 
enhancing trust is seen in open and transparent communication and interaction with other actors. 
As has been stressed by the Kromme Rijn participants, mutual understanding can not be taken 
for granted and should always be checked back with one’s correspondent. We judge it as 
promising sign that communication plays an important role in both case studies as the main 
strategy to both deal with issues of framing differences due to multiple knowledge frames as well 
as to ensure and maintain trust among actors. The case study examples reveal different patterns 
of communication such as information sharing, asking questions, dialogue or negotiation (WUP, 
KR). A salient finding throughout the case studies is the differentiation of communication with 
the public. The general stance is to inform the public and allow for discussion in public only 
after having discussed internally or with experts. On the one hand this has to do with the view 
towards lay people as not being able to conceptualise and understand uncertainties, which is very 
frequent among scientists as well (see Frewer et al., 2003). On the other it relates to the image 
the decision-makers and particularly public administration (as well as scientists) have or think 
they have, i.e. to be knowledgeable about things (WUP, see also Bergkamp et al., 2003). We 
consider early involvement of organized stakeholders as well as the public in general important 
in order to make processes more transparent and allow for taking a wide range of ideas and 
perspectives from the start. We would rather opt for letting the public take part in the uncertainty 
considerations than hiding uncertainties from them in order to not unsettle them. 
Expectations towards others are an important aspect of trust. In the discussion about climate 
change and its possible impacts, the Wupper participants expect scientists to develop adequate 
means to obtain more detailed and reliable information. On the one hand that reflects a trust in 
science to advance sufficiently in the predictions of the future. On the other, as we do not 
consider that option as realistic (see also Bergkamp et al., 2003, Wardekker et al., 2008), the 
participants’ expectations indirectly mirror a responsibility of the researchers for communicating 
differently on climate change research and possible results. As pointed out by Patt (2007), 
scientific framing of uncertainties influences how decision-makers frame uncertainties. Many 
authors also highlight the need for more tailored communication of uncertainty to make it more 
useful for decision-makers (Bergkamp et al., 2003, Patt, 2007, Wardekker et al., 2008). This 
opens up two new boxes of discussion: a) about the role of science for policy and b) on the 
options for climate change adaptation, mitigation and climate proofing which is beyond the 
scope of this paper despite being highly relevant and interesting questions.  
Another example of the importance of scientific evidence in decision-taking is modelling. 
Modelling was a prominent strategy in managing uncertainty, particularly in the Wupper case. It 
can indeed be a strong tool for to better understanding coherences and dynamics of a system. We 
argue that nonetheless that often model calculations are shielding a decision on values. With 
regard to climate change, for instance, major efforts are put into regionalizing the global (already 
rather uncertain) models to reduce the uncertainty of regional climate forecasts. Such a focus 
may prevent people from taking action and discussing and deciding on priorities and which 
values to foster and which goods to protect. That makes dealing with uncertainty a matter of 
choices and priorities. This is evident also in the discussion of putting a mark-up on flooding 
areas in the Wupper. Besides the conceived approaches by the authorities (see section 4.3), a 
logical consequence in this respect would be to not only conceive possible strategies at 
administration level but to include residents of the area into the discussion since they are the 
ones who will be affected, either by flooding or by payments for precautionary measures (see 
also Pahl-Wostl, 2006). Instead responsibilities for dealing with uncertainties associated with 
climate change are mainly delegated to higher administrative levels and science.  
A good example of an adaptive iterative approach for dealing with uncertainty under time 
pressure, particularly with regard to unpredictability issues we consider the example of the 
Kromme Rijn to not leave an uncertainty untouched for too long but draw an intermediate line 
and go on from there as applied in the implementation of their water area plan. These kinds of 
strategies also make it easier for decision-makers “to agree on a single policy despite their 
different expectations about the future” (Groves and Lempert, 2007: 83). We suggest extending 
this generally to complex situations in terms of deliberately drawing internal intermediate 
deadlines for oneself and splitting goals and tasks in subparts in order to make progress and not 
get stuck over a huge uncertainty that is not possible to solve at once. Multi-actor settings 
complicate situations since actors can seldom define and decide things autonomously and 
independently. 
As could be seen, the participants in the case studies do not voice identical views on uncertainty. 
Positioning towards uncertainties turned out to be a highly personal matter. A common thread 
though through both cases which goes in line with findings in literature (e.g. Friend and 
Hickling, 1997, Sigel, 2007) is that uncertainties are regarded as something negative. Despite the 
expressed attitude to see in uncertainties as well a positive challenge the prevailing line of action 
that shows from the examples rather is to prepare well and avoid uncertainties as far as possible. 
The overall aim for dealing with uncertainty is presented as primarily trying to prevent it and 
once faced with an uncertainty to reduce or eliminate it to eventually attain as much certainty as 
possible. Friend and Hickling (1997: 3) remark that it is common experience that carefully 
prepared plans can quickly loose their relevance under the pressure and dynamics of day-to-day 
events. As, moreover, it is not possible to transform every uncertainty into a certainty (e.g. 
Bergkamp et al., 2003, Wardekker et al., 2008), particularly those stemming from system 
variability and complexity, we advocate the adoption of a more positive stance towards 
uncertainty. Beyond acknowledging and accepting uncertainties we state that a mind switch is 
required abandoning the idea of uncertainty as a something negative that has to be avoided and 
reduced by all means. We suggest to instead even look out for uncertainties in order to not get 
too wedged in conventional habits, but attain and maintain a certain level of mindfulness.  
 
Table 4: Cross-checking list for improving dealing with uncertainty 
Framing 
parameters 
Options for improving dealing with uncertainties 
Type of uncertainty  ? Unpredictability: thorough planning in the beginning, good organization and 
preparation including emergency plans, monitoring and evaluation, modelling, 
scenario development, precautionary measures, being flexible & able to 
improvise  
? Lack of knowledge: get as knowledgeable as possible about the situation, that is 
narrow down, solidify and condense information, modelling. 
? Multiple knowledge frames: communication (different patterns) 
? Reframe/ Switch to another framing category of the UM by Brugnach et al. 
(2008) 
Urgency ? Prioritize uncertainty situations   
? Compare with other issues at hand and make yourself an urgency list of things to 
tackle  
? Design a deadline to draw a line and enforce a decision rather than constantly 
postpone taking action due to perceived lack of knowledge and certainty 
? Actors’ differences in urgency perception may be indications for high or low 
performance in solving the uncertainty situation – establish agenda/list with 
stepwise tasks and goals and a timeline for all involved actors 
Positioning ? Acknowledge uncertainties as a fact of life 
? Get a more positive stance towards uncertainties. Look out for positive aspects  
an uncertainty situation  
? Be more daring and take on responsibility involved in being confronted with an 
uncertain future with multiple possible outcomes 
? Maintain a level of mindfulness by looking out for uncertainties to avoid getting 
wedged in traditional habits 
? Always leave some space for improvisation and positive coincidences 
? Find other people who frame the uncertainty more positively 
? Think about what exactly is it that bothers you in the situation 
Responsibility Responsibility for having caused an uncertainty: 
? Acknowledge situational and system complexity  
Responsibility for dealing with an uncertainty: 
? Check out who is responsible for what by law to get a clearer picture. If 
appropriate cross-check if that is the best distribution or if responsibilities may 
be shifted  
? Check if you or other actors could help to solve the situation, e.g. take over some 
responsibility (e.g. shift to higher level), split tasks etc., i.e. strive for shared 
responsibility  
? If responsibility not taken over (by anyone), start communication process with 
the actor/entity perceived as responsible 
 
Trustworthiness Trust towards other actors: 
? Ensure involvement of all relevant actors  
? Ensure and maintain open, honest and transparent communication among actors 
? Get clear about each other’s ideas, stakes and expectations and verify with the 
respective actor if the expectations are likely to be met or not 
? Engage in dialogue with other actors for discussion of differences in framing 
? Rethink the role (and related communication pattern) of each, e.g. who is 
proposing, who is answering things, who is consulted, informed etc.) 
? Transparent (and early) communication of uncertainties 
 
 
6 Discussion 
Isendahl et al. (in press) had pointed out that uncertainties are framed in different ways and 
derived parameters of importance in the framing process. The application of the framing 
parameters in case studies of water management showed that they are accessible and 
understandable for practitioners. It served as a means to detect similarities or disagreements in 
framings. 
Applying the framing parameters interactively moreover allowed for developing options for 
improvement along the parameters. The discussions in the case studies showed, however, that 
coming to options for improving dealing with uncertainty based on an assessment of framing 
parameters is not self-evident. One’s framing has to be questioned and contrasted against that of 
others, especially given the fact that most times uncertainties have to be dealt with in multi-actor 
constellations. As the findings stem from a series of interactions involving numerous discussions 
and cross-questions over the time of the research in both case studies it is difficult to tell which 
thoughts of the participants’ “were already there” and which ones have developed through the 
research by posing questions and discussing in groups. Moreover, it reflects strategies that were 
voiced to be desirable but it is not self-evident that they will actually all be followed in practice. 
As Rouse and Morris (1986: 352) point out there is always the possibility of a distortion between 
what people think or say and what they eventually actually do. 
The strategy discussions in the investigated case studies also point to the limits in assessing 
uncertainty situations and developing strategies for improving dealing with uncertainty along the 
proposed parameters. There are certain types of uncertainty to which it is difficult to apply all 
parameters. That is particularly the case for examples of uncertainty due to unpredictability. In 
the Kromme Rijn case, uncertainty due to (negative) surprises or coincidences was discussed. 
These are difficult to relate to all framing parameters, particularly responsibility, urgency and 
trustworthiness, since they refer to a hypothetic state in the future that cannot be assessed or 
evaluated by parameters in the present (unpredictability by definition). Coincidences can not be 
prepared for (KR). For such uncertainties the strategies necessarily have to be limited to those 
regarding the type of uncertainty of unpredictability.  
For the other uncertainty situations that were discussed in the case studies the framing 
parameters appeared to make sense. Moreover, the participants’ findings suggest that it is 
worthwhile looking at differences in framing in order to develop a new understanding of the 
situation and new action options. These new action options are translated into practical 
recommendations shown in table 4. We propose to use the list as a hands-on aid for practitioners 
in water management which they may apply when stuck in an uncertainty situation (or before 
actually getting stuck). If used interactively with several actors, the list serves as a tool to make 
framings and framing differences explicit and deal with them constructively through the strategy 
options proposed for each parameter. It also serves as a tool to identify knowledge gaps where 
water managers would need support from experts or scientists in order to be able to understand 
uncertainties with a more complex background and be able to take action with regard to them.  
As for the purpose of assessing the parameters the respective insights and results on the ground, 
i.e. improved options to deal with uncertainties, are one objective. As relevant is the very process 
of assessing the parameters, especially in interaction with others. This helps to make framing 
differences explicit, hitherto largely disregarded in water management and scientific analysis, 
and enables reflection and reframing. That way it contributes to social learning which is 
considered as crucial for water management that is performing well over the long-run.   
7 Conclusions 
We have argued that a difference in framing of uncertainties makes a difference in dealing with 
them and that structured, analytical yet pragmatic approaches are needed to effectively deal with 
uncertainties in water management practice. As a first step towards that goal it is thus important 
to make framing of uncertainty explicit and identify possible framing differences. The 
application of the framing parameters in the two case studies showed to be a good means for that 
purpose and particularly to detect similarities or disagreements in framings. The assessment of 
the framing parameters helped raising the awareness among the participants on the various 
aspects of an uncertainty situation and was of use for fostering reflection and discussion on 
framing and strategies.  
As a tool for preparing and structuring decision-making under uncertainty in water management 
practice we developed a cross-checking list along the framing parameters. The list does not 
require major scientific knowledge or assessment. It is designed to be easily applicable for 
practitioners in water management in order to improve dealing with uncertainties by making it 
more systematic and structured. Owing to having been developed in close relation with 
practitioners and along practical examples of uncertainty we hope it may thus successfully serve 
as a guiding tool for water managers for situations of uncertainty. The cross-checking list is not 
meant to be a solution in itself but a grid to develop intervention options and come to decisions 
when facing uncertainty in water management practice. The list constitutes a non-rigid tool that 
can and should be used in a flexible way. In that it addresses the search of Bergkamp et al. 
(2003) for “a middle way between planned and top-down technocratic management and the 
more laissez-faire reliance on spontaneous actions”. The list is no panacea for all uncertainties 
and does not aim at replacing scientific analysis and expert knowledge. It should rather be seen 
as help to identify the gaps from a practitioners’ perspective and allow more tailored scientific 
analyses and decision support. 
To the disappointment of most of the participants of the case studies investigated in this study, 
acknowledging complexity makes clear once again, and as is widely being argued in literature, 
that not every uncertainty may be overcome completely and transformed into a certainty. That 
also implies that dealing with uncertainties in the end is a matter of choices and priorities, which 
to date are often not being taken in the sedulous search for certainty. We believe that a general 
mind switch is needed towards a more positive stance regarding uncertainty. This requires that 
water managers not only acknowledge uncertainties as such but abandon the idea of uncertainty 
as a negative thing one has to get rid off as fast as possible. Instead uncertainties may be even 
searched for in order to attain and maintain a certain level of mindfulness. The list of parameters 
and suggested strategies may be used as a tool for detecting uncertainties, making them explicit 
and deal with them in a constructive and flexible way so that sound decision-making is enabled. 
 
8 Appendix I: Semi-structured interview grid on the framing parameters 
The following questions in English are translated from the originals in German and Dutch that 
were used in the case studies.  
 
1. Which further actors are involved or play a role in the respective uncertainty situation? (as 
stakeholder, originator or decision-maker) (Anonymous reply possible) 
2. Cause: Due to what or whom did the uncertainty situation arise? / Whose “fault” is it that an 
uncertainty situation arose? 
3. a) Please describe the kind of exchange of information with other actors with regard to the 
uncertainty situation (with whom, how often, what for) 
    b) Do you depend on the provision of information or data from others in order to be solve the 
uncertainty situation? ? Y/N ? If yes, from whom and what for? 
4.  a) What is your aim in terms of dealing with the uncertainty situation (also general answer 
possible) 
     b) Whom do you see as responsible for dealing with the uncertainty situation?  
     c) How do you currently deal with the uncertainty situation? Do you (or your entity) follow 
any formal procedure (e.g. from your entity) in that, respectively is there a standardized 
procedure or method or model to do so?   
     d) If yes, do you consider that procedure as adequate and sufficient? 
     e) What do you consider as important in terms of dealing with the uncertainty situation? 
Where do you see potential or need for improvement? (with regard to the current strategy 
or in general) 
     f) How high do you estimate your own options to take influence in the uncertainty situation? 
? High – middle – low. Please explain 
     g) How would you like the other involved actors to behave with regard to dealing with the 
uncertainty situation?  
     h) Are the responsibilities, as you see them, currently being followed? What should be 
improved in that respect? 
5. a) What is your positioning towards the uncertainty situation? What feelings does the 
uncertainty situation provoke in you? (Only give examples for the interviewee when there 
is no immediate answer ? e.g. threat, annoyance, chance, risk, challenge) 
    b) Is the uncertainty situation all in all rather positive or negative for you & why? 
 6. a) Do you (or would you) communicate the uncertainties you perceive towards stakeholders 
or the public? ? Y/N ? Please explain 
     b) Do you communicate on how you yourself (or your entity) deal/s with the uncertainties? If 
yes with whom? If no why not?  
     c) How important do you consider communication and/or collaboration with regard to dealing 
with uncertainty? Please explain 
A- with other involved actors or experts? 
B – with the public? 
7. What role do financial resources play with regard to the uncertainty situation? Do you depend 
on financial support of others for dealing with the uncertainty situation? 
8. Time line: When or within what time line does the uncertainty situation require a decision or 
action to be taken? ? Now/ short term (> 0 < 6 months), middle term (> 6 months  < 5 years), 
long term (> 5 years), “timeless”/ no deadline. Please explain 
9. a) How important is it for you or your entity to solve the uncertainty situation & why? 
(Expected negative impacts?)  
     b) How important is it to solve the uncertainty situation in more general terms, i.e. for the 
public or society? Please explain 
10. Any additional remarks or questions from your side?  
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